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PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS
fect of such a per se rule as possibly leading to the elimination of many
small independent competitors. 48  The situation in Sylvania corre-
sponds with that concern. By 1962 Sylvania's share of the television
market had declined to one or two percent. The new distribution pol-
icy had helped it increase its share to five percent in 1965. 41 Even
though it is controlled by General Telephone and Electronics Corpora-
tion, Sylvania has never been a giant in the television industry.
The antitrust laws were initially enacted to prevent monopolies by
a few large companies. It is certain that the underlying purpose of the
antitrust laws is not being served when interbrand competition is sacri-
ficed to encourage intrabrand competition.5 ° The Schwinn rule should
only be applied to territorial resale restraints and other restraints that
have a similar effect of dividing markets and limiting intrabrand compe-
tition. Dealer-location clauses are not such restraints.
JOHN GALE
Constitutional Law-Presidential Pardons and the Connon Law
The Constitution states that "[t]he President shall . . have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment."' In Schick v. Reed' the
United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether
the commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was a valid exercise of the President's
pardoning power.3 A divided Court4 upheld the validity of this com-
mutation, concluding that the power granted the President under article
II, section 2, includes the power to substitute for the sentence imposed
by the trial court another type of sentence not specifically provided for
by statute. 5 In so holding, the Court extended the scope of the Presi-
48. 388 U.S. at 394.
49. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,793.
50. See note 35 supra.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2.
2. 95 S. Ct. 379 (1974).
3. Id. at 382.
4. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. Justices Marshall, Douglas,
and Brennan dissented in an opinion written by Justice Marshall. Id. at 386.
5. Id. at 384.
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dent's pardoning power beyond its previous judicially recognized
boundaries and beyond the scope of its English common-law counter-
part.
Petitioner Maurice L. Schick was tried for murder in 1954 while
serving in the United States Army.' In the face of conflicting psychia-
tric testimony, the court-martial rejected his defense of insanity and
sentenced him to death.7 After an Army Board of Review and the
Court of Military Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence," his
case was forwarded for final review to President Eisenhower. On
March 25, 1960, the President commuted his sentence to life imprison-
ment, on the express condition that he never be eligible for parole. 10
Schick received a dishonorable discharge from the Army and was trans-
ferred to the federal penitentiary at Lewisberg, Pennsylvania, to serve
his life sentence.11
In 1971 Schick brought suit in the federal District Court for the
District of Columbia to require the United States Board of Parole to
consider him for parole. 12  He argued that the annexation of the no-
parole condition to his commutation was an invalid exercise of the pres-
idential pardoning power. The court rejected his claim and granted
the Government's motion for summary judgment.13  Before the court
6. Id. at 381.
7. Schick was sentenced pursuant to Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 118,
Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1, 64 Stat. 140 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1970)),
which prescribed death and life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole) as the al-
ternative punishments for premeditated murder, the choice being left up to the court-
martial.
8. See United States v. Schick, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 419, 22 C.M.R. 209 (1956).
9. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 71(a), Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169,
§ 1, 64 Stat. 131 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1970)), required the President to
review all military sentences and authorized him to "approve the sentence or such part,
amount, or commuted form of the sentence as he sees fit ..
10. The President's order stated:
"[P]ursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States
by Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution, the sentence to be put
to death is thereby commuted to dishonorable discharge . . . and confinement
at hard labor for the term of his . . . natural life. This commutation of sen-
tence is expressly made on the condition that the said Maurice L. Schick shall
never have any rights, privileges, claims or benefits arising under the parole
and suspension or remission of sentence laws of the United States . .. .
95 S. Ct. at 381. As the dissent noted, "Confinement without opportunity for parole
is unknown to military law." Id. at 389 n.11. The establishment of a parole system
for offenders in military correctional facilities is authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 952 (1970).
11. 95 S. Ct. at 381.
12. Id. Under the federal parole statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970), which was ap-
plicable to Schick because he was imprisoned in a federal institution, a prisoner may
be released on parole after serving one-third of a definite-term sentence or fifteen years
of a life sentence.
13. 95 S. Ct. at 381.
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of appeals heard the case, the Supreme Court decided in Furman v.
Georgia1 4 that death sentences imposed at the discretion of a jury are
unconstitutional.' 5 Because the imposition of the death penalty had
been within the discretion of the court-martial, 1 Schick argued that
Furman should be applied retroactively to his case, thus requiring the
imposition of the only legal alternative punishment, life imprisonment,
with attendant eligibility for parole consideration.' 7 Schick also argued
that the President had exceeded his authority in granting the con-
ditional commutation.' 8 The court of appeals rejected both arguments
and affirmed the decision of the district court.19
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed.20  The majority was un-
persuaded by Schick's argument concerning the retroactivity of Fur-
man. It reasoned that since his death sentence had been commuted
in 1960, he was not under a death penalty at the time Furman was
decided and thus that decision could provide him no relief.2 '
The Court devoted most of its opinion to an examination of the
constitutional validity of Schick's conditional commutation. In inter-
preting the meaning of the pardon power under the Constitution, the
Court relied heavily on the history of the pardoning power in England
prior to the drafting of the Constitution22 and on the Court's previous
interpretations of its scope in this country. It concluded that the par-
doning power granted the President was meant to be unfettered by any
legislative enactments2 3 and held that this power inescapably included
the right to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment without
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. Id. at 240.
16. See note 7 supra.
17. Schick v. Reed, 483 F.2d 1266, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18. Id. at 1268.
19. Id. at 1270. Judge Skelly Wright dissented on the ground that Furman should
be retroactively applied here, thereby invalidating the death sentence and its later com-
mutation. Id. at 1271.
20. 95 S. Ct. at 386.
21. Id. at 382. The dissenters, however, believed that Furman required the eradi-
cation of all adverse consequences of an unconstitutionally imposed death sentence.
Since the punishment substituted by the commutation was more severe than the statute's
only alternative, the dissent considered the conditional commutation to be an adverse
consequence that Furman required to be voided. Id. at 387.
22. The Court observed that "[tihe history of our executive pardoning power re-
veals a consistent pattern of adherence to the English common law practice." id. at
383. The similarity in the English and American prerogatives was intended by the con-
stitutional draftsmen, who "were well acquainted with the English crown authority to
alter and reduce punishments as it existed in 1787." Id. at 382.
23. Id. at 385.
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eligibility for parole,24 even though the latter was not authorized by
statute.
25
The power of the Crown to pardon is deeply rooted in English his-
tory, some say tracing back to the Teutonic tribes. 20 By the time of
Henry VIII, the pardoning power was absolutely and exclusively vested
in the King. He had great latitude in exercising this power; Coke
repbrted that his pardon could be "either absolute, or under condition,
exception, o'r qualification ... *"28 This flexibility ensured the King
an unrestricted ability to bestow mercy. According to Coke, "A pardon
is a work of mercy, whereby the king either before attainder, sentence,
or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execu-
tion, right, title, debt or duty, temporall or ecclesiasticall ..... 1 Its
exercise was seen as being noble, for, as Coke stated, "[m]ercy and
truth preserve the king, and by clemency is his throne strengthened."30
With little modification the constitutional draftsmen brought the
pardoning power of the executive to this country. Because there was
not much debate at the Constitutional Convention over the inclusion
of the pardoning clause,3' it appears that the delegates intended this
power of the President to be similar to that power of the English Crown
with which they were familiar.3 2  Writing in The Federalist No. 74
shortly after the Convention, Hamilton justified the granting of this
power on the grounds that "one man appears to be a more eligible dis-
penser of the mercy of the government than a body of men. 3 Clearly
he and the other framers shared the English view of the pardon as be-
ing an act of mercy. Terming the pardoning power a "benign preroga-
tive," Hamilton wrote, "The criminal code of every country partakes
24. Id. at 384.
25. See note 7 supra.
26. C. JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 1 (1922).
27. In 1535, Parliament enacted the following law: "'That no person or persons,
of what estate or degree soever they be. . . shall have any power or authority to pardon
or remit any treasons, murders, manslaughters or any felonies whatsoever they be...
but that the king's highness, his heirs and successors, kings of the realm, shall have the
whole and sole power and authority thereof . . . ."' Grupp, Some Historical Aspects
of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 51, 55 (1963), quoting An Act for
Recontinuing Liberties in the Crown, 27 Hen. 8, c.24 (1535).
28. E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 233
(1817).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., 2 M. FAIURAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 626 (1911).
32. Schick v. Reed, 95 S. Ct. 379, 382 (1974).
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
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so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions
in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too san-
guinary and cruel. '34
Chief Justice Marshall gave judicial recognition to the view that
a pardon was an act of mercy. Writing for the Court in United States
v. Wilson,3 5 he defined pardon as "an act of grace proceeding from the
power intrusted with the execution of the laws . *"36 Marshall also
stressed the similarity between the English and the American forms of
pardoning power and asserted the need to look to the common law for
guidance:
As this power has been exercised from time immemorial by the ex-
ecutive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose
judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance, we adopt the
principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look
into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it
is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.37
After Wilson the trend of the courts in this country was to view
the granting of a pardon as a personal act of mercy bestowed upon an
individual by the President.8  When questions arose concerning the
nature of this power, courts turned to principles developed at common
law.
The Supreme Court abandoned this historical approach in 1927
with Biddle v. Perovich.39 In an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, the
Court stated that a pardon was an act for the public welfare, "not a
private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power."40
It rested its conclusion concerning the nature of a pardon on logic rather
than on common-law principles or on concepts existing at the time the
Constitution was drafted. 41
One manifestation of this non-historical approach in Biddle was
the Court's use of the terms "commutation" and "pardon" without
drawing any distinction between them. Traditionally, the concepts have
34. Id.
35. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
36. Id. at 160.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
39. 274 U.S. 480 (1927). In this case the petitioner argued that the presidential
commutation of his sentence from death to life imprisonment was invalid because it was
imposed without his consent. The Court upheld the commutation.
40. Id. at 486.
41. The Court announced this departure from the historical approach by stating,
"We will not go into history. . . ." Id.
1975]
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been viewed as completely different forms of clemency. 42 A pardon is
a reduction of punishment that requires acceptance by the prisoner to
be effective.43 A commutation, on the other hand, is a "substitution of a
punishment of a different character for that which has been awarded
by the court."" Unlike a pardon, it does not require acceptance by
the prisoner and can be imposed upon him against his will."5
Biddle disregarded the technical meaning of these terms. It
reasoned that as long as the substituted sentence was one commonly
recognized as being less severe, the prisoner "on no sound principle
ought to have any voice in what the law should do for the welfare of
the whole."146  With this statement the Court discarded the long-stand-
ing requirement of prisoner consent. 47
The Court's statement in Schick that "the requirement of consent
was a legal fiction at best"' 48 shows that the majority shared the views
expressed in Biddle. However, the Court did not rely on Biddle in
reaching its conclusion. Rather, it stated that this conclusion was
"inescapable" "[i]n light of the English common law."49  In fact, the
decision misconstrued the common law.
The distinction between these two forms of clemency was import-
ant at common law. According to Maitland, although the King pos-
sessed the power to pardon, he could not commute sentences. ° He was
able to avoid this disability, however, by granting conditional pardons."
The English law officers Alexander Cockburn and Sir Richard Bethell
explained this limitation on the King's powers in an 1854 opinion as
follows:
"The Crown has no power, except when such a power is ex-
pressly given by Act of Parliament, to commute a sentence passed
by a court of justice. Practically, indeed, commutation of punish-
ment has long taken place under the form of conditional pardons.
42. See, e.g., Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789 (1872).
43. Id. at 798.
44. Brett, Conditional Pardons and the Commutation of Death Sentences, 20
MOD. L. REv. 131 (1957).
45. Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 798 (1872).
46. 274 U.S. at 487.
47. Learned Hand did not share Holmes' view on this matter. Dissenting in
United States ex rel. Brazier v. Commissioner of Immigration, 5 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.
1924), Hand said, "[A] pardon, like a deed, must be accepted to be valid at all." Id.
at 166. He thought that a commutation was necessarily invalid because "the President
may not change the lawful sentence of a court except by reducing it." Id.
48. 95 S. Ct. at 383.
49. Id. at 384.
50. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIsTORY OF ENGLAND 480 (1955).
51. Id.
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For the Crown, having by the prerogative the power of pardon,
may annex to a pardon such conditions as it pleases. Thus for of-
fenses for which the punishment was death, where it was not
deemed advisable to carry the sentence of death into execution, the
course, from an early period, was to grant a pardon on condition
of the convict being transported to some settlement or plantation.
"But this could only be done with the consent of the felon.
The Crown cannot compel a man, against his will, to submit to a
different punishment from that which has been awarded against
him in due course of law." 52
Based on this statement of the law, Cockburn and Bethell ruled that
the commutation of a sentence by the Governor of Barbados was in-
valid.5 3
Early American courts also recognized the distinction between the
two forms of clemency and the necessity for consent. For example,
in Ex parte Wells54 the Supreme Court relied on the consent require-
ment to uphold the validity of conditional pardons. The Court
reasoned that, since the prisoner was required to accept a pardon for
it to be effective, he, rather than the President, was imposing the new
punishment.55 Schick's citation of that case to support its conclusion that
"the pardoning power was intended to include the power to commute
sentences"'56 illustrates its misinterpretation of the traditional views of
the pardoning power.
Schick also went beyond Biddle in holding that a President may
impose on a prisoner a punishment not already authorized by law.5
7
Biddle, although expanding the scope of the pardoning power to in-
clude commutations, did not go so far as to hold that the President had
unlimited freedom in substituting punishments.58 In fact, commen-
tators have viewed that case as "indicat[ing] that by substituting a com-
mutation order for a deed of pardon, a President can always have his
way in such matters, provided the substituted penalty is authorized by
law and does not 'in common understanding exceed the original
penalty.' ,,r0
52. Brett, supra note 44, at 136-37 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 137. "The legal reputations of Cockbum and Bethell are such that their
opinions must command the greatest respect. And this is the more so when, as in the
present instance, the opinion conforms to the accepted principles of English constitu-
tional law." Id.
54. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855).
55. Id. at 315.
56. 95 S. Ct. at 384.
57. Id.
58. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
59. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 475 (1973) (emphasis added).
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Schick, however, concluded that only the Constitution limited the
President and that to require him to substitute a punishment already
authorized by law would place congressional restrictions on his pardon-
ing power.60 While the draftsmen of the Constitution clearly expressed
the view that the pardoning power should not be "'fettered or embar-
rassed,' "61 the context in which they made the statement suggests that
they were referring to the President's freedom to exercise his power,
rather than his freedom to impose new punishments. 62 Hamilton said
that the "benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible
fettered or embarrassed" because he believed that there should be "an
easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt."6 3  In other
words, he felt that the kinds of cases over which the President could
exercise his pardon should not be unduly restricted. He did not, how-
ever, express a view as to the types of punishments the President might
impose.
There is little authority either at common law or in the American
courts concerning the nature of the conditions that can be attached to
a pardon. The most frequent statement of the courts is that the con-
dition can not be illegal, immoral, or impossible to perform. 4 One
American court elaborated on this limitation by saying: "[The con-
dition] must not be impossible, immoral or illegal. It is clear that
[the governor] is authorized to substitute, with the consent of the
prisoner, any punishment recognized by statute or the common law as
enforced in this state." 5  One of the few decisions concerning the Ex-
ecutive's freedom to select a punishment not authorized by law was the
case of the commutation by the Governor of Barbados, referred to
above.66 In that case the law officers Cockburn and Bethell not only
ruled that the order was invalid because it was a commutation, but they
also ruled that even had it been a conditional pardon, it would have
been invalid.6 7 The ground for this latter assertion of invalidity was
that the Governor had substituted a prison sentence of nine years,
whereas the law under which the prisoner was convicted authorized a
60. 95 S. Ct. at 385.
61. Id. at 384, quoting THEF EtnAisr No. 74, at 500 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton).
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 33, at 500.
63. Id.
64. C. JENsEN, supra note 26, at 127.
65. Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 802 (1872) (emphasis added).
66. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
67. Brett, supra note 44, at 137.
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maximum prison term of four years.6 8
Schick wanted to avoid the restriction of the President's pardoning
power by Congress. However, in doing so, the Court allowed the ex-
ecutive branch to exercise powers that were vested in Congress. The
Court had previously stated that "the authority to define and fix the
punishment for crime is legislative . . .and . . . the right to relieve
from punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to methods
by it provided, belongs to the executive department."69 More recently
the Court stated that "[t]he punishment appropriate for the diverse
"170federal offenses is a matter for the discretion of Congress ....
The Court could have permitted both branches to exercise their given
functions, had it recognized the right of Congress to define the outer
boundaries of the President's pardoning power.
In light of this intrusion of the executive branch into the legislative
domain, it is unfortunate that Schick did not clarify the actual basis for
its holding. The Court announced that its decision was grounded in
the "history of the English pardoning power. '71 Nevertheless, an ex-
amination of the decision shows that the Court's conclusions deviated
from the common-law principles significantly. Rather than attempting
to invoke the common law, the Court could have openly announced that
it was abandoning an historical approach and was basing its decision
on currently existing conditions. The Court then could have proceeded
to enumerate the considerations upon which it based its conclusion that
the President has the right to prescribe and impose punishments on in-
dividuals without either the prisoners' consent or the Congress' author-
ization. Such an approach would have illuminated both the scope of
the President's pardoning power and the nature of his relation to
Congress.
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process in Prison Discipli-
nary Proceedings-The Supreme Court Responds
Most correctional systems reduce an inmate's sentence as a re-
ward for serving periods of his confinement without incurring dis-
68. Id.
69. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
70. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955).
71. 95 S. CL at 385.
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